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A lot of attention has been directed towards recent ￿nancial crises around
the world. It seems that ￿nancial markets are prone to herding, panics, con-
tagion and boom-bust cycles. Empirical studies have found that short-term
￿ows increase ￿nancial fragility and also increase the probability of ￿nancial
crises. This study takes a macro-oriented approach and shows that large
and volatile short-term ￿ows may be growth inhibiting for emerging markets.
This is not the case though for rich countries, where short-term capital ￿ows
have no e⁄ect on growth. The results in this study indicate that opening up
emerging markets capital accounts, which imply increased short-term capital
￿ows, is not a clear-cut way to prosperity.
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11 Introduction
For a long time economists held di⁄erent opinions regarding the importance of
the ￿nancial sector. As early as 1781 Alexander Hamilton argued that "banks
were the happiest engines that ever were invented" and on the opposing side
people like president John Adams (1819) said that banks harm the "morality,
tranquillity, and even wealth" of nations.1 Adam Smith himself was positioned
somewhere inbetween, but nevertheless pointed out in the Wealth of Nations
the need for control of the turmoil that follows from the overindulgence of spec-
ulative investment by those he called "prodigals and projectors".2 Today, the
amount of literature covering the topic of ￿nancial intermediaries as growth
promoting is vast. Recent work, theoretical and empirical, has been pointing
towards the same direction, namely: well-developed ￿nancial markets are good
for growth.3
There exists however, another strand of literature that concerns ￿nancial
crises and problems endemic to the ￿nancial markets. Market failures may
arise due to asymmetric information, incompleteness of contingent contracts
bounded rationality and so forth. As a rule, ￿nancial crises are not some isolated
incidents in the ￿nancial markets. They seem to pop up decade after decade,
and so do models that try to explain them. The "￿rst generation￿of models
concerning ￿nancial crises was pioneered by Krugman (1979) and focused on
￿scal imbalances coupled with ￿xed exchange rates. The "second generation￿
of models was suggested by Obstfeldt , in which central banks may decide to
abandon the defense of an exchange rate peg when the unemployment costs of
doing so become to large.4 Recent crises in emerging markets have featured
troubled ￿nancial institutions and sudden reversals of short-term capital ￿ ows.
The heart of the "third generation" of models, like Chang￿ s and Velascos￿(2000),
is the banking model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) where banks take liquid
deposits and invest part of the proceeds in illiquid assets. In doing so they
pool risk and enhance welfare, but also create the possibility of self-ful￿lling
bank runs. These models place international illiquidity, which may result in a
collapse of the ￿nancial system, at the center of the problem. Illiquidity of this
kind is de￿ned as a situation in which the ￿nancial system￿ s potential short-term
obligations exceed the liquidation value of its assets and, may emerge naturally
as an optimal response by banks to some features of the economic environment.
Almost all of the countries a⁄ected by the ￿nancial turmoil the last years
had a common characteristic, namely: large short-term capital in￿ ows, both
short-term debt as well as portfolio ￿ ows.5 When the capital account reversal
came in East Asia it caused a collapse in asset prices and exchange rates. For-
1See Beck, Levine and Loyaza (2000).
2The term "projector" is used by Smith in a pejorative sense meaning, among other things,
"a promoter of bubble companies; a speculator; a cheat." See Sen (1999), Ch1., p. 26, and
footnote 19.
3See King and Levine (1993), Levine and Zervos (1998), Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997),
Raghuram and Zingales (1998).
4See Obstfeldt (1994a), (1994b) and (1996).
5IMF￿ s World Economic Outlook (1998) and (2000).
2eign creditors called in loans and depositors withdrew funds from banks, which
magni￿ed the illiquidity of the domestic ￿nancial system. Financial institutions
came to the brink of default on their external short-term obligations and the
output costs of this crisis have been large.6
The purpose of this paper is to analyze whether excessive short-term capital
￿ ows are growth inhibiting due to increasing ￿nancial fragility and the possibility
of a crisis but also because of the large asymmetric information and moral hazard
problems associated with these ￿ ows. In addition, the question of whether well-
developed institutions can help ameliorate the problems caused in the ￿nancial
markets by short-term ￿ ows is taken into account. Standard growth regressions
combined with panel data and instrumental variable techniques are used in
order to estimate the impact of short-term capital ￿ ows on economic growth.7
Moreover, an extreme-bounds analysis in the spirit of Levine and Renelt (1992)
is conducted in order to check the robustness of the results.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a more extensive the-
oretical and empirical motivation for the study. Section 3 outlines the model
and methodoligacal issues that provides the basis for the estimations and and
Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents the results of this paper, while
Section 6 investigates their robustness by conducting an extreme-bounds analy-
sis. Section 7 concludes.
2 Theoretical and empirical literature
In this section we will go through the di⁄erent components needed in order to
make the inference that short-term ￿ ows are potentially hazardous for growth.
The ￿rst section is devoted to the e⁄ects of ￿nancial markets on growth , and
the second to ￿nancial crises and short-term ￿ ows.
2.1 Financial markets and growth
In recent years numerous papers have been written on the links that exist be-
tween ￿nancial markets and growth. Financial systems and institutions may
arise to ameliorate problems created by information and transaction frictions.
They facilitate the trading, hedging, diversifying and pooling of risk, they al-
locate resources, monitor managers and exert corporate control, they mobilize
savings, and they facilitate the exchange of goods and services.
There are di⁄erent channels through which ￿nancial systems may a⁄ect
growth. The most popular being via capital accumulation and technological
innovation. Growth models with capital accumulation by Romer (1986), Lucas
(1988), Rebelo (1991) and Zilibotti and Acemoglou (1997) use either capital
externalities or capital goods produced with constant returns to scale, where
factors can be accumulated in order to generate steady-state growth. In these
models, the ￿nancial system a⁄ects growth by in￿ uencing the rate of capital
6See for example Furman and Stiglitz (1998) and Rodrik (1998) and (2001).
7Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Sala-i-Martin (1997).
3formation. The ￿nancial system a⁄ects capital accumulation by altering the
savings rate, by reallocating savings among di⁄erent capital producing technolo-
gies or by allowing the economy to better diversify its investment opportunities.
On technical innovation, a second class of growth models by Romer (1990),
Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) focuses on the
invention of new production processes and goods. In these models, the ￿nan-
cial system a⁄ects the steady-state growth by altering the rate of technological
innovation.
Empirical ￿ndings in recent years have shown that well-functioning stock
markets and banks promote long-run economic growth. The main channel link-
ing ￿nancial development with growth runs through productivity growth rather
than capital stock growth. Financial intermediaries exert a positive impact on
TFP growth, which feeds through to overall GDP growth.8 On the other hand
the long-run links between ￿nancial intermediary development and both physi-
cal capital growth and private savings rate are, at best, tenuous. The evidence
is consistent with the view that the ability to trade ownership of an economy￿ s
productive technologies easily promotes more e¢ cient resource allocation, cap-
ital formation, and faster economic growth. It is not just listing securities on
an exchange; it is the ability to trade those securities that is closely tied to
economic performance.
Another important link that has been analyzed is the legal and regulatory
determinants of ￿nancial intermediary development. Since contractual arrange-
ments form the basis of ￿nancial activities, legal systems that protect creditors
and enforce contracts are likely to encourage greater ￿nancial intermediary de-
velopment than legal and regulatory systems that impede creditors from gaining
access to their claims or that ine⁄ectively enforce contracts. A paper by Ross
Levine (1997) ￿nds that countries with legal systems that assign a higher priority
to creditors extracting the full present value of their claims against corporations
in the case of bankruptcy or reorganization have more developed ￿nancial in-
termediaries. Also, countries with legal systems that more e⁄ectively enforce
contracts have better developed ￿nancial intermediaries. Furthermore, there
is a strong positive link between ￿nancial intermediary development and the
degree of corporate information disclosure.
By and large, a good legal and regulatory environment seems to mitigate
problems endemic to the ￿nancial markets and promote the development of
￿nancial intermediaries. Moreover, well-developed ￿nancial systems promote
long-run growth through higher productivity growth.
2.2 Financial crises and short-term capital ￿ ows
Short-term capital ￿ ows do not carry any intrinsic threat towards an economy or
the ￿nancial markets. In many cases they may even have a positive impact on an
economy. One key issue does arise though; towards what ends are these short-
term capital ￿ ows used. Financial markets are, in some respects, fundamentally
8See King and Levine (1993).
4di⁄erent than markets for goods and services. Here market failures arise due
to asymmetric information, incompleteness of contingent contracts, bounded
rationality and so on.9 These failures are endemic to the ￿nancial markets and
it seems that what would have been mistakes with minor consequences in a
closed economy can become magni￿ed into a major crisis in an open economy.10
A counter-argument is that ￿nancial markets are correct in their judgement
most of the time, and that sharp reversals of capital ￿ ows are usually the result
of change in fundamentals, such as external shocks or policy mistakes.11 This
argument is, at best, shaky. It is known that ￿nancial market volatility is well
beyond what can be explained by movements in fundamentals. While at least
some fundamentals surely underlie every ￿nancial crisis, the magnitudes of the
crises, according to Rodrik (1998), are often disproportionate with any plausible
change in the fundamentals.12 There are, for example, no known changes in
fundamentals that could possibly account for the sharp reversal of capital ￿ ows
towards Asia in 1997.13
There are several papers that treat the topic of causes of ￿nancial crises.
Demirg￿c-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) ￿nd strong evidence in favour of the
common belief, that ￿nancial liberalization makes crises more likely. They also
￿nd that crises could be, to some extent, mitigated by institutional develop-
ment. They note that "country experience suggests that the bene￿ts of ￿nancial
liberalization may have to be weighted against the cost of increased ￿nancial
fragility.￿
Financial liberalization per se, should not have any e⁄ect on the ￿nancial
systems fragility. The increased fragility comes through variables that increase
disproportionately with the liberalization implementation. In general, stud-
ies show no statistically signi￿cant relationship between growth or investment
and capital account liberalization.14 One contributing factor to this increased
fragility is that, full capital account liberalization often means larger short-term
borrowing. Some short-term capital is essential for the economy to run. If sav-
ings are low, and investment misallocation is not marginal then the additional
short-term capital ￿ ows can play an important role in an economy￿ s future. If
this is not the case though, then the main e⁄ect of additional short-term capi-
tal ￿ ows is to increase the vulnerability of the economy. The most productive
investments are long-term, and the mismatch between the maturity of assets
and liabilities can give rise to serious problems. The net bene￿ts appear even
smaller when the reserves set aside to protect against the volatility of short-term
9See for example Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
10See Bacchetta and Caminal (2000), Bacchetta and Wincoop (1998).
11See Rodrik (1998), Frankel and Rose(1996).
12This concerns secondary markets, Shiller (1989).
13In 1996, ￿ve Asian countries (Thailand, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Phillipines)
received net private capital in￿ows of approximately $ 93 billion. In 1997, they experienced an
out￿ow of approximately $ 12 billion, which is quite a turnaround in one year. This indicates
that commercial banks either got it terribly wrong in 1996 and earlier or, they were terribly
wrong in completely pulling out thereafter.
14For a survey see Edison et al. (2002).
5capital are taken into account.15 A recent paper by Eichengreen and Leblang
(2003) however shows that capital controls have a signi￿cantly positive e⁄ect on
growth in periods of ￿nancial instability but negative when crises are absent and
the controls a⁄ect the resource allocation in an economy, suggesting hence that
the net e⁄ect of controls is context speci￿c and that potential capital account
liberalization bene￿ts dominate the costs when the domestic ￿nancial system is
robust and the international system is not prone to crises.
Here it is important to note the distinction Meade (1951) made between
￿ temporary￿and ￿ continuing￿capital movement, where the key underlying notion
behind this distinction is that of reversibility, the risk that capital pulled in
by certain temporary factors could ￿ ow out once the attractions waned. An
empirical study by Turner (1991) established a stability ranking in the following
order: long-term bank loans, foreign direct investment, investment in bonds,
investment in shares and lastly short-term credit. Moreover, Chuhan et al.
(1996) provide empirical evidence in support of the view that short-term ￿ ows
are ￿ hotter￿than FDI.
Also relevant, for the moral hazard and asymmetric information problems,
are the incentives within internationally active organizations to maximize short-
term gains. For example UK external manager￿ s have mandates for around three
years and may lose them if they have not performed su¢ ciently well; monitoring
is typically done every three months. The US time horizons seem to be even
shorter, with very frequent monitoring and possible changes of mandates every
one to two years. Moreover, fund managers fees in these countries are related
to the value of funds at year-end or they are even more directly performance
related. All this increases the potential for volatility as fund managers cannot
￿ a⁄ord￿to make losses and/or to perform worse than average.16
A recent study by Rodrik and Velasco (1999) provides a conceptual frame-
work for evaluating the e⁄ects of short-term capital ￿ ows. A model with joint
determination of maturity and the cost of external borrowing, highlights the
role played by self-ful￿lling crises. The empirical analysis shows that the short-
term debt to reserves ratio is a robust predictor of ￿nancial crises, and that
greater short-term exposure is associated with more severe crises when capital
￿ ows reverse. Their evidence is consistent with the idea that illiquidity makes
emerging-market economies vulnerable to panic. Regardless of fundamentals,
a large exposure to short-term debt intensi￿es the cost of a crisis because it
magni￿es the current-account adjustment and currency depreciation that needs
to be undertaken. This was clearly shown in the crisis countries in East Asia
where external debt levels where relatively low, but the levels of short-term
debt relatively high. The crises were caused in part by the refusal of lenders
to roll over these short-term loans. Moreover, there is a high cost, beyond the
budgetary cost of bailouts, associated with the economic disruption that follows
from ￿nancial crises: the one of growth slowdown after a crisis.
The papers above share the common feature that ￿nancial crises are driven
15See Rodrik (1998), Rodrik and Velasco (1999), Chang and Velasco (2000), Furman and
Stiglitz (1998).
16See Stephany Gri¢ th-Jones (1998).
6by the illiquidity of banks, which makes them more relevant for emerging mar-
kets. It makes them so, because banks play a much larger role in emerging
markets than in mature economies and because emerging markets access to
world capital markets is more limited.
Another recent theoretical paper by Aghion et al. (2000), emphasizes the
role of ￿nancial factors as a source of instability in small open economies. This
model di⁄ers from the models discussed above in the sense that ￿nancial distress
is not driven by bank illiquidity, but rather through changes in relative prices
between an economy￿ s tradeable and nontradeable sector.
The basic model is a dynamic open economy model with one tradeable and
one non-tradeable good. The non-tradeable is used as an input to the produc-
tion of the tradeable and ￿rms face credit constrains that depend on the level
of ￿nancial development. The underlying mechanism in the model is a combi-
nation of two forces: ￿rst, more investment leads to more output and c.p., to
higher pro￿ts. Higher pro￿ts improve creditworthiness and fuel more borrowing,
which leads to more investment. Capital, that is not FDI, ￿ ows into the country
to ￿nance this boom. The boom in investment increases the demand for the
non-tradable input and raises its price relative to the tradeable good. This rise
in prices leads to lower pro￿ts in the tradeable sector and therefore, reduced
creditworthiness, less borrowing and less investment and a fall in aggregate out-
put. The two basic implications of this model are the following: ￿rst, economies
at an intermediate level of ￿nancial development are more unstable than either
very developed or very underdeveloped economies.17 Second, in economies at
an intermediate level of ￿nancial development, full ￿nancial liberalization may
actually destabilize the economy. The common ground for the illiquidity based
models and this model is that in both cases the drop in output due to ￿nan-
cial market malfunction will occur only occur in emerging markets and not in
developed economies.
Ultimately, we can say that the above analysis indicates that while ￿nancial
markets as an entity are probably good for growth, parts of these ￿nancial
markets have a more dubious e⁄ect on growth and in the case of emerging
markets, possibly a negative one. A major candidate for these dubious e⁄ects
are short-term capital ￿ ows, which tend to have more pronounced moral hazard
and asymmetric information problems attached to them than long-term ￿ ows.
2.3 Some stylized facts.
There is a long list of possible determinants for the maturity structure of capital
￿ ows. Short-term ￿ ows can have a useful role to play in fostering e¢ cient ￿nan-
cial intermediation. It is expected that both demand and supply for maturity-
17The reason why an intermediate level of ￿nancial development is important for this result
should be easy to see: at very high levels of ￿nancial development, most ￿rms investment is
not constrained by their cash ￿ow. Therefore shocks to cash ￿ow are irrelevant. On the other
hand, at very low levels of ￿nancial development, ￿rms cannot borrow very much in any case
and therefore their response to cash-￿ow shocks will be rather muted. Shocks will die out
without causing any great turmoil. It is then at intermediate levels of ￿nancial development
that shocks will have a strong enough e⁄ect to be a source of instability.
7transformation services to increase with ￿nancial sophistication, and the volume
of short-term ￿ ows should also increase with the openness of an economy.18
Government choices of regulatory policies are also important. Governments
have at their disposal a range of ￿nancial and regulatory policies that in￿ u-
ence the structure of capital ￿ ows, and their policies often stimulate short-term
capital ￿ ows. The Basle capital adequacy standards, for example, encourage
short-term cross-border lending to non-OECD economies by attaching a lower
risk weight to short-term loans. The Thai government set up The Bangkok
International Banking Facility in 1993, which speci￿cally aimed at attracting
short-term funds from abroad. The Korean government is often blamed for
having encouraged short-term in￿ ows by making longer-term investments in
Korea di¢ cult for foreigners. We can see below, in Table 1 how short-term
￿ ows essentially exploded during the 90￿ s in several East-Asian countries, with
the Korean increase of 928 percent at the top.19
Table 1: The Development of Short-Term Capital Flows in East-Asian countries.
(Million U.S $)
Average Short-term Flows St. Dev. of Short-term Flows
Country 1979-90 1991-96 1997-00 1979-90 1991-96 1997-00
Korea 1061 10891 16269 950 7245 6001
% increase between periods 926% 49% 663% ￿17%
Malaysia 794 1407 1392 574 840 1672
% increase between periods 77% ￿1% 46% 99%
Singapore 1946 7325 17120 2295 4796 15815
% increase between periods 276% 134% 109% 230%
Thailand 1475 4879 6455 1617 2647 2658
% increase between periods 231% 32% 64% 4%
Limits on the short-term foreign liabilities of domestic banks, deposit require-
ments on capital in￿ ows, and restrictions on the sale of short-term to foreigners
are examples of policies that can reduce short-term capital in￿ ows. Chile￿ s
capital-account regime represents a canonical case of successfully changing of
a country￿ s maturity composition of ￿ ows, and has been studied extensively.
The Chilean authorities imposed a time dependent reserve requirement on all
external credit except equity investments. Evidence in a number of papers ￿nd
that the restrictions have a⁄ected the maturity composition of ￿ ows, though
not their overall volume. This, together with solid fundamentals and a sound
18See Rodrik and Velasco (1999).
19The de￿nition of short-term capital ￿ows in this paper is found in chapter three, Tables
1 and 2 shows short-term capital ￿ows in absolute ￿gures, hence no distinction is beeing
made between in￿ows and out￿ows. See also ￿gures in Appendix II to see the development of
short-term ￿ows over time. The di⁄erent time periods are reported with respect to ￿nancial
liberalization and occurred ￿nancial crises. The country selection goes to show the di⁄erences
within some regions.
8￿nancial system, are probably the main causes that Chile was not a⁄ected by
the Mexican ￿ tequila￿crises in 1995.20 We can see in Table 2 that Chile had an
increase of only 64 percent of short-term ￿ ows in the beginning of the 90￿ s. This
can be compared with increases ranging from 200 up to 450 percent in other
Latin American countries.
Table 2: The Development of Short-Term Capital Flows in in L.-A. countries.
(Million U.S $)
Average Short-term Flows St. Dev. of Short-term Flows
Country 1979-90 1991-96 1997-00 1979-90 1991-96 1997-00
Argentina 2414 7166 6520 1926 7897 2745
% increase between periods 197% ￿9% 310% ￿65%
Brazil 2764 15397 7028 2427 15970 5255
% increase between periods 457% ￿1% 558% ￿67%
Chile 816 1341 2721 547 409 1427
% increase between periods 64% 103% 25% 249%
Mexico 4820 15259 7464 4108 8832 4124
% increase between periods 213% ￿51% 64% 4%
3 Methodology
Growth theory suggests that growth is driven by accumulation, therefore a ba-
sic growth regression should include measures of growth in production factors:
physical capital, labor and human capital, that is Y = F(K;L;H), where
the conventional notation applies. Since the dependent variable will always
be growth of GDP per capita the growth of the labor force will be included
implicitly in the regressions. The regressions below will include, real investment
as a share of GDP and the rate of accumulation of human capital. This choice
of explanatory variables can be derived from an aggregate production function
for endogenous growth models or the augmented Solow-Swan model . Further,
given the support for conditional convergence in the empirical growth literature
a measure of initial income, which can be derived directly from the Solow-Swan
model will also be included among the regressors, where both endogenous growth
models and the Solow-Swan model predict that the measure of initial income
will have a negative e⁄ect on growth. However, the endogenous growth models
predict a positive impact of human capital on growth due to imbalances between
physical and human capital, whereas the Solow-Swan model predicts a negative
impact due to diminishing returns to reproducible factors.21 In addition to the
traditional variables in growth regressions our model will include some measure
of short-term capital ￿ ows (X), and other appropriate control variables (Q).
Hence a general form of our regression can be expressed as:
20Valdes-Prieto and Soto (1996), Budnevich and Lefort (1997), Larrain, Laban and Chu-
macero (1997), Montiel and Reinhart (1997). De Gregorio, Edwards and ValdØz (2000).
21See Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995), Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992).
9￿y = f (y0;h;k;X;Q) (1)
This equation tells us that a country￿ s per capita growth rate will depend
on some initial output, the rate of accumulation of human capital, the rate of
capital accumulation, our variable of interest (X) which in this case is some
measure of short term capital ￿ ows and a set of control variables (Q).
We use a panel data approach in order to avoid certain econometric di¢ cul-
ties. Firstly, if regressions are based on average values of growth and short-term
capital ￿ ows over long time periods, there is a potential simultaneity problem.
Over long time periods the level of short-term ￿ ows is likely to be in￿ uenced
by the development of ￿nancial markets, which is highly correlated with growth
and GDP. This means that if ￿nancial markets develop faster over a twenty
or thirty year period, growth and GDP will be higher, but the development of
￿nancial markets also a⁄ects short-term capital ￿ ows. As a result the indepen-
dent variable may be correlated with the error term in the growth regression.
Moreover, panel regressions are more e¢ cient since they take into consideration
information that comes from time variation.22 This takes us to the problem of
choosing the period length in the panel data. Time-periods that are too short,
such as annual observations, give rise to multicollinearity problems, hence the
ever present question of optimal lag length of the explanatory variables. Fur-
thermore there is, in panel regressions, the occurrence of short-term co-variation,
like business cycles, which might constitute a problem. In order to avoid most
problems and reap the bene￿ts of panel regression we use non overlapping 5-
year period averages. The reasons for choosing non overlapping 5-year period
averages are several. Firstly, it mitigates the problem of long-run simultane-
ity. Secondly, the problem of cyclical co-variation is hopefully removed by using
period dummies, in addition to the ￿ve-year period averages and thirdly, most
￿nancial crises that have occurred during the examined time period have been
within ￿ve years of a country￿ s ￿nancial liberalization.23
The time variation of the data is in this case particularly interesting, since
the time period when countries liberalized their capital accounts, and confronted
increased short-term capital ￿ ows, varies signi￿cantly. An additional reason
for using a panel data approach lies in the ability to allow for di⁄erences in
the aggregate production function across countries. Panel data methods also
increase the number of observations and enhance therefore the statistical basis
for conclusions. Important to note is also that a panel data approach mitigates,
to some extent, the simultaneity problem. Since the period of observation is
shorter, it is less likely that the error in the growth regression will a⁄ect the
short-term capital ￿ ows in the same period.24 However, using panel data in
growth regressions brings forth the issue of dynamic paneling. Since initial
income appears on the right hand side we have a part of the dependent variable
22See Levine and Zervos (1998), Beck et al. (2000).
23See F￿lster and Henrekson (1999) and (2001), Mehrez and Kaufmann(2000).
24See Islam (1995).
10as an explanatory variable. This problem is resolved by using ￿ out of sample￿
data to instrument for yt￿1, and making it a strictly exogenous variable.25
An issue in panel data concerns the presence of heteroscedasticity in sev-
eral dimensions. One form of heteroscedasticity appears in time-series, when
variables are drawn from di⁄erent distributions and the error-term spread is
too large. This can easily be amended with common corrections such as White
(1980) and Newey-West (1987). Another form of heteroscedasticity can be the
one between countries. The largest country in the sample is 60 times larger
than the smallest in terms of their population, and growth tends to vary less in
large countries than in small ones. One standard solution to this is to weight
countries in such a manner that the weight attached to each country is inversely
proportional to the standard deviation of the error term.26 The fact that we can
rarely be certain about the nature of cross-section heteroscedasticity is, accord-
ing to Greene (1999), a minor problem since weighted least squares estimators
are consistent regardless of the weights used, as long as the weights are uncor-
related with the disturbances. In our case, tests show that the data does not
exhibit any heteroscedasticity in the time dimension but well within the panel
dimension.27
Even if some econometric problems can be corrected the suspicion of endo-
geneity in some of the right-hand side variables will always be present. To cope
with the possibility of endogeneity seems to be a challenge for the literature of
empirical growth economics and we will try to address this problem to some ex-
tent. One potential advantage is perhaps that, as mentioned earlier, it is easier
to argue that the development of growth in a country causes short-term capital
to ￿ ow in or out of the country.28 But it is much harder to argue that growth
will have an e⁄ect on the volatility of short-term capital ￿ ows. If one still be-
lieves that there is cause to worry about endogeneity problems in the variable
of interest, several instrumental variable techniques are employed to come to
terms with the endogeneity issue. As usual, the problem of ￿nding adequate
instruments, without losing too many degrees of freedom in the regressions will
of course be present.
25Penn World Table 6.1 has for most countries data from 1950 or 1951 and onwards for Real
GDP. For some countries, like Singapore, the series start around 1960 and the time interval
is 3 years instead of 5. The instrument has an explanatory power larger than 90 percent.
26See Baltagi (2001) Ch. 5 and Greene (1999) Ch.12.
27LM tests for heteroscedasticity within panels give a ￿2 (1) value of 2:5 and we can not
reject the null of constant variance. In the panel dimension however, the LR tests produce
a ￿2 (33) value of above 90 in all occasions which clearly rejects the null. Moreover, tests
of autocorrelation in the error terms, Wooldridge (2002) and Drukker (2003), accept the null
of no autocorrelation, in the regressions. All panel estimations are conducted with White
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance.
28Celasun, Denizer and He (1999) ￿nd that the growth rate of real GDP, does not a⁄ect
short-term or total capital ￿ows.
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Two measures of short-term capital ￿ ows volatility will be used in order to assess
the impact on growth.29 The ￿rst is short-term capital ￿ ow volatility as a share
of GDP, which is a quite intuitive way to measure the impact of short-term
capital ￿ ows in an economy and is related to the model of Aghion et al. (2000).
The second measure is the ratio of short-term capital ￿ ow volatility to reserves,
which is more connected with the e⁄ects of short-term capital ￿ ows impact on
the ￿nancial sector. Even though this variable is not a very good measure of
solvency, nor is it easily linked to the health of the economy, it is nevertheless
important for three reasons. First, the ratio measures a country￿ s vulnerability
to a Diamond-Dybvig bank run, since it measures liquidity. Second, a high ratio
may signal imprudent macroeconomic or regulatory policies . Third, the ratio
of short-term in￿ ows to reserves is an indicator of the vulnerability of a country
to a self-ful￿lling capital withdrawal.30
The volatility measure also allows the possibility of an additional interpreta-
tion. If the volatility has positive impact on growth, it can be viewed as having
well functioning ￿nancial markets that put funds to their most productive use.
If, on the other hand, the volatility measure has a negative impact on growth,
then we have poorly performing ￿nancial markets. An additional merit of the
volatility measure is that it￿ s less prone to simultaneity bias. It is easier to argue
that the development of growth in a country causes short-term capital to ￿ ow
in or out of the country. But it is clearly harder to argue that growth will have
an e⁄ect on the volatility of short-term capital ￿ ows.
The set of control variables includes a measure of capital controls. This
variable for capital account restrictions is also interesting in its self, since a lot
of current research is being conducted on the topic of the e⁄ects on growth
due to capital account liberalization.31 Furthermore it is also an indication of
￿xed versus ￿ oating exchange rate, and it will also control for the time period
a country has liberalized its capital account. An additional control variable in
the regressions is a measure of a country￿ s openness to trade, which has often
been found to a⁄ect growth.
The data in this study is constructed for the years 1970-2000, depending of
course on data availability. To ￿ll gaps in the series, all time varying variables
are averages over non-overlappig ￿ve-year periods. The dependent variable in
the regressions will always be the average annual growth rate of GDP per capita
in constant prices (￿yi;t) and is computed using data from Penn World Table
6.1 (PWT 6.1) as:
29Easterly, Roumeen and Stiglitz (2000) ￿nd that private capital ￿ows volatility increases
growth volatility, which is negatively correlated with growth.
30Furman and Stiglitz (1998) comment on this variable and say that: ￿The ability of this
variable, by itself, to predict the crises of 1997 is remarkable". Also they comment on the fact
that the higher this ratio is, the more likely it is that a country is pursuing other problematic
policies.
31A note of caution is in order since capital controls come in various shapes and forms, the





￿ 100 (B=beginning of period, E=end of period).
Other variables that will always be included in the regressions are:
inY Initial income which is measured as the log of real GDP per capita,
in current international $ and is reported with the initial year for each subperiod.
Edu: The rate of accumulation of human capital is measured as average
schooling years in the total population over age 25 and is reported with the
initial year for each subperiod. The data are from Barro and Lee found in
Harvard/CID homepage.
Inv: Investment ratio, which is calculated as the period average of real
investment as a share of GDP for each subperiod Data form PWT 6.1.
RES: Reserves are measured as total reserves plus gold. Data from
IFS/IMF of disk.
CAR: The measure of capital account restrictions will follow Dani Ro-
driks (1998) guidelines and will be the proportion of years, in every subperiod,
for which the capital account was free of restrictions. For the developing coun-
tries I have used the data of Kim (1997) in Rodrik (1998), and complemented for
recent years using IMF annual reports on exchange restrictions. For developed
countries I have used information from Mehrez and Kaufmann (2000) in order
to create the variable.
OPEN: The second control variable, which is the sum of exports and
imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross domestic product in
real terms. Data from PWT 6.1.
These are all quite common de￿nitions of variables when conducting sim-
ilar growth estimations. When it comes to the variables of interest, namely
short-term capital ￿ ows, things get a bit more complicated, lack of adequate
and available data and di⁄erent constructions of variables, all with their own
advantages and disadvantages are to be found.32 The measure for short-term
capital ￿ ows (STF) that will be used is from Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1995)
and has been augmented to include banks as well. It is constructed from IMF￿ s
￿ Balance of Payments Statistics￿by adding the following lines:33
￿ 4600 Portfolio Investment
￿ 4998 Errors and Omissions
￿ Other investment: Assets
￿ 4724 Loans, Banks, of which short-term
￿ 4727 Loans, Other sectors, of which short-term
￿ 4733 Currency and deposits, Banks
￿ 4734 Currency and deposits, Other sectors
32See Furman and Stiglitz (1998), Arteta, Eichengreen and Wyploz (2001).
33Since this is a Balance of Payments Statistics, net in￿ows are positive and net out￿ows
are negative, irrespective of whether they are classi￿ed as assets or liabilities.
13￿ Other investment: Liabilities
￿ 4768 Loans, Monetary Authorities, of which short-term
￿ 4771 Loans, General Government, of which short-term
￿ 4774 Loans, Banks, of which short-term
￿ 4777 Loans, Other sectors, of which short-term
￿ 4789 Other liabilities, Monetary authorities, of which short-term
￿ 4792 Other liabilities, General government, of which short-term
￿ 4795 Other liabilities, Banks, of which short-term
￿ 4798 Other liabilities, Other sectors, of which short-term
The volatility measurement that is constructed from these short-term capital







where n is the number of years in each subperiod. One advantage of the above
construct is that apart from the volatility it also captures a level e⁄ect of short-
term capital ￿ ows in the economy.
When it comes to country selection it is known that mixing rich and poor
countries does not represent a good test of what theory predicts, if there are
reasons to believe that markets, in this particular case the ￿nancial markets, be-
have di⁄erently in developing countries compared to rich countries. This study
will include the richest developed and developing countries, divided into two
sub-samples. The prerequisite being that the countries have a, more or less,
functioning ￿nancial sector. A total of 38 countries where included, but due to
data availability, or lack thereof, a ￿nal selection of 34 developed and develop-
ing countries were selected.34 The cuto⁄ point for this selection is the poorest
OECD country, measured with GNP per capita PPP adjusted, which is Turkey;
the measurement is prior to the 1995 Latin American crises, and all oil pro-
ducing countries and tax evasion paradises are excluded from the sample. So,
the rich countries selected are: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nor-
way, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States,
and the developing countries are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Israel,
Korea, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Singapore, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay,
Venezuela.
34Excluded countries due to data shortage are Belgium, Germany, Hong Kong, and Lux-
embourg.
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The basic formulation of the model developed in the previous section will be
applied ￿rstly in a pure cross-country framework on a sample of 34 developed
and developing countries with the following form:
￿y70;00 = c + ￿1y70 + ￿2h70 + ￿3k70;00 + ￿4X70;00 + ￿5Q70;00 + " (2)
where GDP per capita growth between 1970 and 2000, (￿y70;00), depends on
initial GDP per capita, (y70), on the initial level of education, (h70), on the
investment share of GDP, (k70;00), on average values of our variables of interest,
(X70;00), and ￿naly on average values of our control variables for the period in
question, (Q70;00). The results are presented in Table 3.
Table 3: Regressions for the e⁄ects of Short-Term capital ￿ ows on growth, 1970-2000.
Cross country regressions
All All Rich Rich Developing Developing
Countries Countries Countries Countries Countries Countries
InY ￿1:59￿￿￿ ￿1:52￿￿￿ ￿2:44￿￿ ￿2:35￿ ￿3:77￿￿￿ ￿2:63￿￿
(3:96) (4:18) (2:24) (2:09) (4:44) (2:63)
INV 0:07￿￿ 0:07￿￿ 0:05 0:06 0:02 0:05
(2:08) (2:13) (0:91) (1:02) (0:52) (1:20)
EDU 0:25￿￿ 0:22￿￿ 0:13 0:10 0:60￿￿ 0:40￿￿
(2:20) (2:10) (0:96) (0:70) (2:91) (2:31)
VSTF/RES ￿0:59 ￿0:85 1:82
(0:87) (0:96) (1:38)
VSTF/GDP ￿21:54￿ ￿2:19 ￿50:78￿
(1:83) (0:16) (2:19)
CAR 0:53 0:57 ￿0:08 ￿0:20 1:79 1:12
(0:74) (0:83) (0:10) (0:23) (1:70) (1:12)
OPEN 0:01￿￿ 0:02￿￿￿ 0:02￿ 0:02 0:03￿￿￿ 0:03￿￿￿
(2:28) (2:88) (1:82) (1:11) (3:21) (3:92)
Obs. 34 34 20 20 14 14
R2
adj: 0:53 0:57 0:25 0:20 0:79 0:83
Note: *, ** and *** denote signi￿cance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels respectively, jtj-ratios in parentheses.
All regression include a constant.
The results from Table 3 do not seem to give any particular signi￿cant e⁄ect
of short-term capital ￿ ows. In the words of Rodrik (1998): ￿ If there is a correla-
tion... it does not jump out from the table". The variables (V STF=RES; V STF=GDP)
are essentially uncorrelated with long-term economic performance once other
determinants are controlled for. Even if V STF=GDP is marginally negative
signi￿cant there are too few observations and moreover the signi￿cance dis-
appears if other variables are included in the equation. The standard growth
15regression variables such as Education, Investment, Initial Income and Open-
ness are all signi￿cant in the full sample regressions, which validates the model
speci￿cation.
In order to exploit the time variation of our variables of interest we turn over
to our panel estimations. These panel will take on a number of forms in order
to address several econometric issues that arise with each form of estimation.
However, we can make some a priori hypotheses about our results, since theory
gives some guidance for the e⁄ect of short-term capital ￿ ows on growth and it
also gives guidance regarding how empirical studies should be speci￿ed. For
example, both Aghion et al. (2000) as well as Chang and Velasco (2000) claim
that one should ￿nd a negative e⁄ect only in emerging markets, i.e. markets
that do not have a very high level of ￿nancial development.
Table 4 presents the ￿rst regression results of panel data estimations. Our
observations consist of non-overlapping ￿ve-year periods in an unbalanced data
set. All regressions include period dummies in order to prevent spurious cor-
relation and are corrected for heteroscedasticity across panels.35 Moreover, in
order to avoid biases due to dynamic paneling the initial income variable is
instrumented by using out of sample values as instruments. In the ￿rst panel
the estimations do not include country dummies and investment, education,
openness are instrumented by their lagged values in order to avoid endogeneity
issues. These estimations will however su⁄er from omitted variable bias, since
country speci￿c e⁄ects account for observable and unobservable e⁄ects that are
constant over time. The second panel in Table 4 includes country speci￿c ef-
fects which, while correcting for the omitted variable bias, automatically create
issues of potential endogeneity bias, since the within-estimations have an error
term that contains an average of all time periods. Hence, lagged variables are
no longer valid instruments and the estimations are conducted on contempora-
neous levels, with the exemption of initial income, which is instrumented by out
of sample data and is still valid. The discrete time model used for estimations
in Panel I and Panel II respectively can be expressed as:
￿yi;t = c + ￿t + ￿1yi;t￿1 + ￿2hi;t￿1 + ￿3ki;t￿1 + ￿4Xi;t (3)
+￿5Qi;t￿1 + "i;t
￿yi;t = ￿i + ￿t + ￿1yi;t￿1 + ￿2hi;t + ￿3ki;t + ￿4Xi;t (4)
+￿5Qi;t + "i;t
Even if all the estimations in Table 4 have their own potential de￿ciencies
they do however show some interesting trends concerning our variables of inter-
est.36
35The results do not hinge on the correction of heteroscedasticity accross panels. They are
extremly robust accross a variety of estimation methods.
36Hausman tests tend, in general, to reject the null of no di⁄erences between the two models
when V STF=RES is used, but not for V STF=GDP.
16Table 4: Five-year period Regressions for the e⁄ects of Short-term capital ￿ ows on growth.
Weighted Panel Data Regressions 1970-2000. No ￿xed e⁄ects
All All Rich Rich Developing Developing
Panel I Countries Countries Countries Countries Countries Countries
InY ￿0:65￿￿ ￿0:67￿￿ ￿1:12￿￿ ￿1:14￿￿ ￿1:47￿￿ ￿2:01￿￿￿
(2:09) (2:15) (1:98) (1:98) (2:48) (3:40)
INV 0:06￿￿ 0:05￿￿ 0:04 0:04 0:10￿￿￿ 0:07￿￿
(2:39) (2:12) (1:03) (1:18) (2:87) (2:26)
EDU 0:05 0:07 ￿0:04 ￿0:04 0:13 0:29￿￿
(0:84) (1:09) (0:71) (0:63) (1:11) (2:43)
VSTF/RES 0:05 0:15 ￿2:45￿￿￿
(0:28) (0:82) (3:70)
VSTF/GDP ￿6:32 5:60 ￿35:73￿￿￿
(1:26) (1:24) (4:01)
CAR ￿0:11 ￿0:13 ￿0:23 ￿0:25 ￿0:08 0:85
(0:34) (0:39) (0:84) (0:95) (0:14) (1:51)
OPEN 0:005￿￿ 0:01￿￿ 0:01 0:003 0:003 0:02￿￿￿
(2:14) (2:55) (1:43) (0:73) (0:72) (4:74)
R2
: 0:19 0:20 0:26 0:27 0:51 0:55
Obs. 170 170 100 100 70 70
Weighted Panel Data Regressions 1970-2000. Fixed e⁄ects included
All All Rich Rich Developing Developing
Panel II Countries Countries Countries Countries Countries Countries
InY ￿1:07￿￿ ￿1:05￿ ￿1:22￿￿ ￿1:24￿￿ ￿0:18 ￿0:68
(2:02) (1:94) (2:55) (2:51) (0:20) (0:73)
INV 0:07￿￿ 0:07￿￿ 0:05 0:04 0:01 0:03
(2:24) (2:27) (1:25) (1:09) (0:16) (0:86)
EDU 0:02 0:03 ￿0:03 ￿0:04 0:17 0:75￿￿￿
(0:10) (0:16) (0:20) (0:26) (0:68) (2:92)
VSTF/RES ￿0:12 ￿0:03 ￿3:76￿￿￿
(0:65) (0:25) (6:49)
VSTF/GDP ￿0:98 0:30 ￿40:00￿￿￿
(0:20) (0:07) (5:43)
CAR ￿0:40 ￿0:40 ￿0:77￿￿￿ ￿0:75￿￿￿ ￿0:03 ￿0:07
(1:42) (1:41) (3:19) (3:08) (0:06) (0:12)
OPEN 0:01￿ 0:01￿ 0:06￿￿￿ 0:06￿￿￿ ￿0:01 ￿0:02￿￿￿
(1:77) (1:74) (4:81) (4:37) (1:10) (2:67)
R2
: 0:45 0:45 0:55 0:55 0:69 0:65
Obs. 186 186 110 110 76 76
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance. Time dummies included in all regressions.
Note: ￿, ￿￿ and ￿￿￿ denote signi￿cance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels respectively.
17In the ￿rst two columns, when all countries are in a common pool, we see that
short-term capital ￿ ows have no strong signi￿cant e⁄ect on economic growth.
On the other hand, when one divides the countries into two subsamples, di⁄erent
patterns begin to emerge. We see that the impact of short-term capital ￿ ows on
growth, (V STF=RES;V STF=GDP), seem to follow the theoretical predictions
that were presented previously and have a strong negative impact for developing
countries, while not a⁄ecting rich economies.
A review of the results in Table 4 presents us with a variety of results.
However, one result that is robust is the e⁄ects of short term capital ￿ ows on
growth. These variables seem to be insigni￿cant for the whole sample as well as
the sample containing only rich countries. On the other hand, for the sample
of emerging markets the results are negative and highly signi￿cant. The ￿rst
variable of short-term ￿ ows to reserves indicates that emerging markets su⁄er
from illiquidity problems within their ￿nancial sector, which makes, according
to theory and empirical observation, ￿nancial crises more likely and therefore
hampers long run growth. The second variable, which measures short-term
￿ ows to GDP has also a signi￿cant negative e⁄ect on growth. This result is
in line with the predictions from the theoretical work of Aghion et al. (2000),
where intermediate levels of ￿nancial development are unstable, due to emerging
market ￿rms cash-￿ ow constraints, and can cause ￿nancial distress.37
Rich countries seem to follow somewhat the neoliberal orthodoxy, in the ￿xed
e⁄ects setting, in the sense that capital account restrictions are signi￿cantly
negative for growth and increased openness to trade is good for growth. The
results obtained that refer to the developing sample di⁄er somewhat in their
indications and possible explanations. Firstly, we see that increased trade has
a negative impact on growth in Panel II and a positive impact in Panel I.
Secondly, we see that the variable of capital account restriction is insigni￿cant
in both speci￿cations. However, a small note of caution about the CAR variable
might be in order here since it is a crude and imprecise measure and might not
fully capture all the properties of interest.
Finally, even if the problem with dynamic paneling is avoided above there
are still a number of estimation problems with their respective biases that have
to be addressed. Due to these problems the results can, at this stage, only be
viewed as correlations and give us only indications of potential trends. In order
to avoid potential biases we have to move on to instrument regressions.
5.1 IV-Estimations
The ￿rst step in the instrument approach is try and rid our estimations of the
endogeneity problems that occur due to country speci￿c e⁄ects. A simple dif-
ferencing, ￿growtht = f(￿xt), of the regression removes the country speci￿c
e⁄ects. This rids us of the potential omitted variable bias without changing the
underlying e⁄ects of the explanatory variables on growth. However, since the
37It may also be and indication of badly functioning ￿nancial markets, where capital is not
put to its ￿ most￿productive use.
18dependent and independent variables are in contemporaneous time periods, the
potential for endogeneity still exists and we need to ￿nd valid instruments for
our explanatory variables. We can utilize the fact that lagged levels, (xt￿2),
or lagged di⁄erences, (xt￿2 ￿ xt￿3), of our variables may be valid instruments
and utilize methods proposed by Anderson and Hsiao (1982) (AH) to estimate
our regressions. One general problem with the AH instruments though is that
they tend to be ine¢ cient. To improve our instruments we can use the GMM
method proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), called the ￿ di⁄erence￿estima-
tor where, for each observation in the data we can use the maximum available
lags as instruments. However, even if the ￿ di⁄erence￿estimator uses more in-
formation than AH, lagged levels are still potentialy ine¢ cient as instruments
for di⁄erences. We can then turn to an additional GMM method, called the
￿ system￿estimator. The ￿ system￿estimator is an expansion of the ￿ di⁄erence￿
estimator made by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1997).
In addition to the ￿ di⁄erence￿approach, the ￿ system￿estimator includes also,
lagged di⁄erences as instruments for the levels of our variables. The ￿ system￿
estimator is utilized in Beck et al. (2000) as well as Eichengreen and Leblang
(2003) for similar exercises and seems to be the most e¢ cient in terms of instru-
menting. The general drawback in all these instrumental approaches lies in the
loss of degrees of freedom. The di⁄erencing and lagging of our variables reduces
our degrees of freedom that are available for statistical inference. However, the
results obtained from these IV approaches coupled with the results from Table
4, which we can use as some form of benchmark, provide strong indications of
the e⁄ects of short term capital ￿ ows on growth in emerging markets.
The construction of our AH instruments show that our variables of interest,
when we utilize the second level lag a full explanatory variable set have a ￿rst
step explanatory power of 0:52 for V STF=RES and 0:26 for V STF=GDP.
Table 5 presents the results obtained from the IV regressions for the developing
sample, which present the main idea behind the paper. Any departures from
conventional results for the full or rich country sample will be duly noted. For
the ￿ di⁄erence￿and ￿ system￿estimator we report the ￿rst step results of the
estimations, since the second step estimates have a severe downward bias in
their standard errors. Also, the Sargan test of overidenti￿ed restrictions as
well as tests for autocorrelation in the error structure are presented. The null
hypothesis for these tests should be accepted for valid estimations.38
The results in Table 5 show that the instruments for our variables of in-
terest are not only signi￿cantly negative, they are also robust across the spec-
trum of estimation methods. Wald tests con￿rm that our point estimates for
V STF=RES and V STF=GDP are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from each other.
These IV-results con￿rm the initial ￿ndings of signi￿cant negative impact on
growth from short term capital ￿ ows in emerging markets. Moreover, when
we compare the results in Table 4, Panel I and the results obtained from the
￿ system￿estimation we see that they exhibit some similarities. We have to keep
38The serial correlation test for the AH estimations is suggested by Drukker (2003) and
Wooldridge (2002), while the tests for serial correlation in the GMM estimations are suggested
by Arellano and Bond (1991).
19in mind that the results in Table 4 are subject to panel heteroscedasticity cor-
rection, while the GMM estimates are not. If the regressions in Table 4 are
conducted without the correction, the results obtained show no sini￿cant di⁄er-
ences. Wald tests of all variable coe¢ cients and model Hausman tests con￿rm
this by accepting the null of no di⁄erences.
Table 5: IV-Regressions for the e⁄ects of Short-term capital ￿ ows on growht.
Panel Regressions, 1970-2000. Developing countries.
AH a AH a Di⁄erenceb Di⁄erenceb Systemc Systemc
InY ￿8:39 ￿17:85￿ ￿1:62 ￿1:72 ￿1:72￿ ￿2:17￿￿
(0:99) (1:93) (0:88) (0:94) (1:97) (2:65)
INV ￿0:56 ￿0:59 0:02 0:07 0:07￿ 0:06￿
(1:18) (1:27) (0:28) (0:85) (1:94) (1:82)
EDU 17:35 21:76 ￿0:03 0:34 0:28 0:34￿￿
(0:50) (0:58) (0:05) (0:59) (1:61) (2:03)
VSTF/RES ￿2:49￿￿ ￿3:05￿￿￿ ￿1:85￿￿
(2:16) (3:03) (2:30)
VSTF/GDP ￿25:83￿ ￿33:26￿￿ ￿26:67￿￿
(1:94) (2:32) (2:38)
CAR ￿4:56 ￿5:51 0:23 0:25 0:64 0:57
(0:84) (0:94) (0:25) (0:28) (1:04) (0:94)
OPEN ￿0:27￿ ￿0:28￿ ￿0:01 ￿0:01 0:01 0:02￿￿
(1:79) (1:81) (0:76) (0:64) (1:56) (2:03)
Sargan test 0:99 0:94 0:60 0:69
Serial corr. test 0:84 0:71 0:15 0:03 0:27 0:24
Note:￿, ￿￿ and ￿￿￿ denote signi￿cance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels respectively. Time dummies included.
a Regressions corrected for cross-sectional heteroscedasticity, jtj-statistics in parenthesis.
b;c jtj-statistics in parenthesis.
These ￿ndings lead us to believe that: a) any potential omitted variable bias
in Panel I is of no importance and b) the model estimated in Panel I is correctly
speci￿ed and not subject to potential endogeneity bias. Panel II in Table 4
on the other hand, which includes country speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects, seems to su⁄er
from bias in the estimates.
If we try to link the results obtained to a more coherent explanation, then
the following presents a possibility: Rich countries and developing countries
di⁄er in several aspects when it comes to growth promotion. The IV-results for
the developed sample, even if not presented, show a consistency with Table 4,
where openess has a positive signi￿cant e⁄ect on growth, while capital account
restrictions have, in general, a negative e⁄ect on growth. For the emerging
markets, the indications are that increased short-term capital ￿ ows as such
are not clear-cut ways to prosperity. The indications are rather that increased
openness to capital ￿ ows, especially short-term, and perhaps trade is something
20countries embark on sequentially as they develop, in order to reap the bene￿ts of
growth. Interestingly, in Appendix I we see that, the variable V STF=RES has
a much higher mean and maximum values for the developed countries than for
emerging markets while the mean of V STF=GDP is higher for emerging markets
than for developed economies. This could indicate larger ￿nancial fragility in
emerging markets. Moreover, both variables, V STF=RES and V STF=GDP,
have a positive correlation with openness for the developed economies, while for
the emerging markets the former is negative and the latter possitive. This could
perhaps indicate that short-term capital ￿ ows are more related to some possible
underlying real production in rich countries. Lastly, the fact that investment
or education become insigni￿cant in some estimations, both in Table 4 and 5,
is not a cause of worry for several reasons. This is due to fact that we try to
capture within country variation, which is necessary in order to capture the
e⁄ects of short-term capital ￿ ows on growth. In addition, we should remember
that in the standard cross-country setting these variables are indeed signi￿cant
in explaining growth.
The results so far have been unanimously pointing toward the fact that short-
term capital ￿ ows have a detrimental e⁄ect on growth for emerging markets,
while no such indications exist for developed economies.39 Even so, there are
certainly objections to the estimations above. One could be the fact that we
should be controlling for macroeconomic imbalances in an economy instead of
controlling for trade and capital account liberalization. This follows on, to
some extent, from the idea that a ￿nancial crisis can be triggered if a country
su⁄ers from unsustainable macroeconomic imbalances. Large and unsustainable
macroeconomic imbalances will make countries ￿ riskier￿and we will therefore
observe larger short-term capital ￿ ow volatility.
One way to lessen potential objections and strengthen the results obtained
from our estimations is to include additional control variables in our regressions.
However the reestimation of all regressions for any additional control variable
is a tedious and unnecessary task. Our results indicate that the esimations in
Table 4, Panel I, have at least three advantages. Firstly, we do not incur any
severe losses in degrees of freedom, secondly the estimates do not seem to be
subject to potential biases and thirdly we can correct for panel heteroscedastic-
ity. Hence, these estimations can serve as valid benchmarks and the results can
be further examined by conductiong a robustness check through the application
of an extreme-bounds analysis (EBA) in the spirit of Levine and Renelt (1992).
By adding variables to our regressions we will be able to control for a variety
of observables that may potentialy a⁄ect growth. The drawback is of course
that we can not control for time invariant unobservables, as we do in a ￿xed
e⁄ects speci￿cation. The EBA mirrors the approach adopted in cross-country
regressions that search for growth determinants.40
39The variable V STF=GDP becomes slightly positive signi￿cant in the ￿ system￿estimation,
with a p-value of 0:093, for the developed sample. Otherwise, all other estimations show an




The sole purpose of this section is to investigate the robustness of the results
obtained for emerging markets in my base regression. Since the main purpose
of this paper has been to investigate the e⁄ects of short-term capital ￿ ows
in emerging markets it follows quite naturally to restrict my extreme-bounds
analysis to incorporate only emerging markets.
An EBA is used to test the robustness of coe¢ cient estimates to alterations
in the conditioning set of information. Levine and Renelt￿ s (1992) (LR) em-
pirical application of Leamer￿ s (1983) EBA has adopted the common feature
of cross-country growth regressions, where explanatory variables are entered
independently and linearly, hence the EBA implies regressions of the form:
￿y = ￿j + ￿ijI + ￿mjM + ￿ZjZj + " (5)
where ￿y, is as previously per capita GDP growth, I is a set of variables always
included in the regression, M is the variable of interest and Zj is a subset
of three variables chosen from a pool (Z) of additional control variables. The
model has to be estimated for all possible combinations of Zj 2 Z. Each model j
produces one point estimate of the variable of interest ￿mj and its corresponding
standard deviation ￿mj. The lower extreme bound is de￿ned as the lowest
point estimate ￿mj ￿ 2￿mj and the upper extreme bound as the highest point
estimate ￿mj + 2￿mj. If ￿mj remains signi￿cant and of the same sign at the
extreme bounds, then we can maintain a fair amount of con￿dence that the
partial correlation and the variable of interest can be considered to be ￿ robust￿ ,
otherwise the variable will be considered ￿ fragile￿ .
The I variables in this EBA will consist of the explanatory variables in
the base regressions made in the previous chapter namely: Initial GDP (In
Y), investment (Inv), education (Edu), capital account restrictions (CAR), and
openess (OPEN). The M variables are as always: short-term ￿ ows to reserves
(V STF=RES) or short-term ￿ ows to GDP (V STF=GDP). The pool of Z vari-
ables consists of variables that have been used in Sala-i-Martin (1997), Levine
and Renelt (1992) or F￿lster and Henrekson (2001). In order to restrict the
number of Z variables we can discard variables that are constant over time
(such as land area), that are not available for parts of the timeframe examined,
or that are simply irrelevant for the sample of countries used in this analysis
(such as revolutions and coups). The ￿nal selection of the Z pool consists of
the following ten variables: Government share of GDP (GOV), growth of gov-
ernment share (GOVG), overall bugdet balance as a share of GDP (BUDGET),
in￿ ation (INF), the standard deviation of in￿ ation (SDINF), the share of ur-
ban population (URBAN), log of life expectancy (LIFEX), labor force growth
(LFG), current savings (SAVE), and the growth of the consumption share of





= 120 possible combinations of Zj 2 Z for each of the variables of
interest.
22Lastly we can note that the ￿rst ￿ve variables can be viewed as controls for
various potential macroeconomic imbalances.
There are several objections against the LR methodology. One is that it
introduces multicollinearity, in￿ ates the coe¢ cient standard errors and exag-
gerates the range on the coe¢ cient of interest. This multicollinearity problem
is though of, according to LR (1992), as a re￿ ection of a weak-data problem .
Another objection is brought forward by Sala-i-Martin (1997). He notes that
there is a ￿ reverse data-mining￿problem. If you try di⁄erent combinations of
control variables it is almost guaranteed to ￿nd one or several combinations
of control variables that renders the coe¢ cient of interest insigni￿cant or even
causes it to change sign. In this sense the EBA may be ￿ too strong￿ . On the
other hand if the variable(s) of interest passes a test that is ￿ too strong￿it should
be considered as ￿ good news￿ , that is by passing a ￿ too strong￿test, they should
not have problems passing any weaker tests.
The results from the robustness test for the regressions on my emerging
markets sample using ten conditioning variables are presented in Table 8. Where
the ￿ Base￿refers to the regression estimates in Table 4 and does not include any
Z variables.
Table 6: Sensitivity results for Emerging markets
Weighted panel regressions, 5-year averages (1970-00)
M-variables:
V STF=RES V STF=GDP
High Base Low High Base Low
￿ ￿3:64 ￿2:47 ￿2:13 ￿44:52 ￿35:72 ￿30:75
S:E: 0:69 0:66 0:72 8:96 8:91 9:57
t ￿ stat: ￿5:25 ￿3:72 ￿2:96 ￿4:97 ￿4:01 ￿3:21
LFG SDINF LIFEX INF
Z ￿ variables LIFEX CONSG BUDGET GOV
GOV SAVE GOV SAVE
Obs. 70 70 68 69 70 68
R2 0:55 0:50 0:51 0:56 0:55 0:55
Robust/Fragile Robust Robust
Table 6 shows that the estimated e⁄ects for V STF=RES and V STF=GDP
are robust with respect to the stringent EBA criterion. Both lower and upper
bounds are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero and both bounds are negative. Over-
all, the results of the EBA seem to imply that we can maintain a fair amount
of con￿dence that the negative results between short-term capital ￿ ows and
economic growth for emerging markets is ￿ robust￿ .42
42The variables STF/RES and STF/GDP are within the EBA bounds and signi￿cant even
if I only regress them on growth together with the period dummies. Additional explanatory
237 Conclusions
Recent ￿nancial crises around the world have drawn a lot of attention to them-
selves. It seems that ￿nancial markets are prone to herding, panics, contagion
and boom-bust cycles. Empirical studies have found that short-term ￿ ows in-
crease ￿nancial fragility and increase also the probability of ￿nancial crises.
This study has taken a macro-oriented approach and the results support the
notion that that high and volatile short-term ￿ ows are growth inhibiting for
emerging markets. This is not the case though for rich countries which have an
insigni￿cant experience from short-term capital ￿ ows. The results concerning
the negative e⁄ects of short-term capital ￿ ows on growth for emerging markets
seem to be robust for di⁄erent estimation methods and pass stringent EBA
criteria.
Euclides is supposed to have said to Ptolemaios: "There is no ￿ royal road￿to
geometry." The results here indicate that there is no ￿ royal road￿to prosperity
either by opening up emerging markets capital accounts, which imply increased
short-term capital ￿ ows. There is no argument that good prudential regulation,
that is enforced, and well-developed institutions, both national as well as in-
ternational, will counteract ￿ excessive￿short-term ￿ ows so that the bene￿ts of
capital account liberalization exceed the costs. The question, for future research,
is what kind of institutions need to be developed? Should emerging markets fo-
cus on a broader anticorruption strategy, or should they focus on pure ￿nancial
market regulation, or both? In the meanwhile there is growing evidence that
controls can be e⁄ective in discouraging short-term ￿ ows. The Chilean expe-
rience has shown that restrictions have a⁄ected the maturity composition of
￿ ows, but not their overall volume. In conclusion, if indeed short-term capital
￿ ows are growth inhibiting for emerging markets, they should discourage them,
perhaps by imposing some form of controls in the short run and by developing
better institutions in the log run.
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28Appendix I: Descriptive statistics and Correlation matrices.
Descriptive Statistics
V STF=RES V STF=GDP
Developed Emerging Developed Emerging
mean 0:44 0:37 0:024 0:032
std 0:54 0:39 0:027 0:031
max 4:32 1:98 0:16 0:19
Correlation matrix of explanatory variables, All countries.
InY INV. EDU. CAR OPEN VSTF/RES VSTF/GDP
InY 1
INV. 0:19 1
EDU. 0:69 0:18 1
CAR ￿0:62 ￿0:25 ￿0:45 1
OPEN 0:03 0:56 ￿0:09 ￿0:22 1
VSTF/RES 0:20 ￿0:19 0:17 ￿0:24 ￿0:12 1
VSTF/GDP 0:26 0:21 0:05 ￿0:34 0:58 0:47 1
Correlation matrix of explanatory variables, Developed markets.
InY INV. EDU. CAR OPEN VSTF/RES VSTF/GDP
InY 1
INV. 0:05 1
EDU. 0:50 ￿0:02 1
CAR ￿0:71 0:12 ￿0:43 1
OPEN ￿0:03 ￿0:18 ￿0:05 0:03 1
VSTF/RES 0:32 ￿0:33 0:24 ￿0:39 0:11 1
VSTF/GDP 0:39 ￿0:23 0:14 ￿0:41 0:48 0:70 1
Correlation matrix of explanatory variables, Emerging markets.
InY INV. EDU. CAR OPEN VSTF/RES VSTF/GDP
InY 1
INV. 0:18 1
EDU. 0:54 0:23 1
CAR ￿0:35 ￿0:42 ￿0:19 1
OPEN 0:32 0:72 0:05 ￿0:51 1
VSTF/RES ￿0:04 ￿0:21 ￿0:03 0:10 ￿0:27 1
VSTF/GDP 0:45 0:48 0:15 ￿0:39 0:71 0:11 1
29Appendix II: Development of Short-Term Capital ￿ows in selected countries.
Figure 1: The development of short-term capital ￿ ows in millions of U.S
dollars in selected Latin-American countries from 1979-1999.
Figure 2:The development of short-term capital ￿ ows in millions of U.S
dollars in selected East-Asian countriesfrom 1979-1999.
30Appendix III: Data description of EBA variables.
Name Description Source
GOV Government share of GDP, percent, PWT 6.1
current prices.
GOVG Growth of Government share of GDP, PWT 6.1
current prices.
SAVE Current savings, percent, PWT 6.1
current prices.
CONSG Growth of Consumption share of GDP, PWT 6.1
current prices.
URBAN Urban Population, percent of total. WDI 2000
Data on disk
LIFEX Log of Life Expectancy at birth, no. of years. WDI 2000
Data on disk
INF Annual in￿ ation, percent. WDI 2000
Data on disk
SDINF Standard Deviation of In￿ ation, WDI 2000
calculated using in￿ ation. Data on disk
LF Growth of Labor Force, annual percent. WDI 2000
Data on disk
BUDGET Overall Budget Balance, WDI 2000
percent of GDP. Data on disk
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